Beliefs vs. Common Values in Muslim-Christian Dialogue

Posted on 31 January 2010

At first, the challenge of the concept of Christian and Islamic theology was whether it existed or not. “There is no Islamic theology,” says Tariq Ramadan. “It is meaningless, and in actual fact wrong” to compare the Islamic scholars’ conversations with Christian theology (Western Muslims and the Future of Islam 11). What is specifically wrong about it, in his opinion, is that “theology” is a specifically Christian term, and Islam as a faith does not work like this.

An “Islamic theology” is exactly what Karl Rahner and Seyyed Hossein Nasr presuppose. Some Muslims might have problems with this because “theology” is said to be a specifically Christian term, and Ramadan in particular thinks this form of theology has been imposed on understandings of Islam. As Wilfred Cantwell Smith notes, Christians ask, “What do they believe?” (On Understanding Islam 240) He suggests Christians and Muslims are not wrong in discussing theology; rather, he says they are just asking the wrong questions. The questions should not be about what one believes, but whether that belief is acted out with a sense of common values.

Regardless, the fact is, whether it exists or not, both Christians and Muslims must deal with each other’s and one’s own theological similarities and conflicts. One can meander around the existence of theology, but one inevitably comes face to face with its implications and consequences. Upon more reflection, and taking heed of Smith’s observation, a common understanding of the role of theology for both traditions is pertinent.

Rahner seems to take for granted the importance of theology in Christianity, as do most Christians, while presupposing this view onto Islam. Theology is an important part of the Christian faith, informing all parts of a Christian’s understanding of God. Christian theology, as Smith notes, is often defined by “belief,” with the question stated above: “What do they [Muslims] believe?” Sometimes starting with this can be faulty logic, since “what people believe is not always the ultimate religious question at all,” and “complicated by the confusion of using ‘belief’ also for the quite different ‘faith’” (240).

It is interesting how Smith describes Islamic theology a “philosophy of religion” in Islam. For Islam, Smith argues, the law (Sharia) is the most important element in a Muslim’s faith (241). So the focus of the role of theology is important because a common role can be found despite the differing types of theology. Smith implies that as long as one’s belief is informed by one’s faith, theologies in both faiths remain in their proper place, without imposition of one on another. The wrong thing that needs to be prevented is belief simultaneously describing one’s faith, and assuming this on the other faith. This, says Smith, is how theology goes beyond its boundaries.

With this in mind, dialogue still cannot ignore definitions. One should not cease in talking about what theology is for a particular faith: “One of the responsibilities, in our day, of comparative religion studies is that of constructing concepts…by means of which divergent religious traditions may become mutually intelligible” (235). Dialogue between Muslims and Christians cannot be set in two different modes of understanding, two different styles.  They have to stem from the same framework, meaning the two faiths come to the same table for the same reasons. A “Christian” understanding of theology will not impede on Islam’s understanding of its faith.

Whether Islam “has” a theology or not, it still has beliefs and values. It still has a frame of reference where the centerpiece is God, or Allah. The challenge seems to lie in the West, where Nasr states that neither Christianity nor Islam can impose its views on the other; however, the larger and vaguer “West” “in distinction from Christianity is seeking to impose its views of politics in relation to religion upon the whole world.” Instead, Nasr believes dialogue and mutual understanding will not come if one side is set on domination, or “triumphalism” (217). For Nasr, in other words, the problem of the West is not the theological but rather the secular law that imposes itself upon other cultures, people, and worldviews.

Does this mean that theological debate between Islam and Christianity is actually getting in the way of other possibly fruitful conversations on “secular,” and more practical, discussions of economic justice, gender rights, and democracy? On the surface, it seems that way.

However, Seyyed Hossein Nasr discusses some concepts that Christians and Muslims often are conflicted over.  One, partly mentioned above, is the idea of Law.  For the West, which includes Christianity, “Laws” that shape the social boundaries of a society are not rooted in any theological tradition, but are somewhat secular. Laws in the West come from the State. But Islamic law in the public sphere is rooted in Divine Law: “The Divine Law molds society and not society the Divine Law” (“Islamic-Christian Dialogue: Problems and Obstacles” 217). It is not that the West does not have “sacred laws”; rather, it is that the West differentiates between laws imposed by people and laws imposed by God.

What looks like theology getting in the way for the West and/or Christianity, is actually just what Islam regards as theological, as in Divine Law. With this in mind, it would help to come to an understanding over what “Divine Law” is for both Christians and Muslims, since “many Muslims also claim that the separation of Christianity from politics in the West is only outward, and that there are hidden links between the two which are revealed from time to time” (217). Nasr gives the example of abortion where the convolution between secular and divine law is imminent.

Another challenge for Nasr between Christianity and Islam in relation to the theological is salvation, or “who is saved.”  “It is important to bring the question of who is saved to the center of the stages of dialogue and discuss it vigorously” (216). Why would Nasr suggest that a subject as touchy as “who is saved” be discussed? He even admits the recent surge in fundamentalisms within both faiths, where a “narrowing of faith” has occurred. “Many Muslims, hardened by attacks against them by both Christian missionaries and secularists…propagate…the idea that all non-Muslims are kafir in the theological sense and condemned to eternal damnation” (216).

While Muslims have included in their tradition a concept of the “people of the book,” which considers Christians rightful followers of the one God, Nasr notes that “for Christians to extend the possibility of salvation beyond the redemption offered by Christ is difficult indeed” (215). Soteriological discussions on theology might only seem to create an impasse between these already colliding faiths; however, Nasr indicates the history of a “universalist perspective of Islam” that “has always answered ‘those who follow their tradition faithfully, if it be an authentic revealed religion’” (216). Nasr warns that one must be careful when reasserting this universalist perspective of salvation in Islam, but it is a step in the right direction.

However, where should a theological discussion between these faiths begin? Ramadan asserts in starting with the basic fundamentals of one’s faith, in his case, Islam. (This is easier said than done, especially regarding Christianity!)  The answer, it seems, lies in all these writers’ understandings of their own faiths. Ramadan states, “the heart of the message of Islam is that a living spirituality comes at the price of willingly making the effort to come back to what is essential, to contemplate the world and to take the road back toward one’s self” (Ramadan, 122). Continually, “to this state of recollection and humility must be added another concrete dimension of spiritual teaching that requires the establishment of a constant link between the demands of a conscience and life choices” (123).

In following a message of “living spirituality,” Smith notes that Christians called to “living in Christ” is parallel to the Islamic idea of ummah, or Muslim community (Smith, 240). Christians can and should live out their faith in a “living spirituality” that is embedded in concepts of community, solidarity, and justice, if the Christian faith is really in God. Ramadan’s assertion that a “concrete dimension of spiritual teaching” is fundamental to a living spirituality is also linked to the ummah. To live spiritually and concretely, as Ramadan believes, one has to direct an ethic to society, community and the world.

Likewise, Rahner engages authentic Christianity, Trinitarianism, and Monotheism with “concrete” monotheism: the idea that Christian life and practice of faith must be rooted in “devotion in the present world” (“Oneness and Threefoldness of God in Discussion with Islam” 117). Christian ideas of monotheism are “not metaphysical” alone, but “historical,” meaning it reflects the actual “experience of salvation history” (110). He suggests a “radicalization of the Trinity,” which exemplifies the history of revelation, and thus the mystery of God.

This would bode well with Nasr, who criticizes absolutist notions of the Trinity and other dogmas: “When the Trinity is considered completely in divinis and identical with God as Unity so that unity has not significance outside of the Trinity…it is very difficult if not impossible to come to basic theological understanding with Islam” (214).

Rather, Rahner wants to retain the Trinity not as a dogma but as a practice, rooted in history. It is a Trinity “on the ground,” which recognizes the importance of salvation being more than just a metaphysical concept. There is a mystery to God, but it is revealed through concrete knowing of Jesus’ salvific event. He critiques the “theoretical monotheists” who do not base their understanding of faith in a historical context. Though the discussion is theological, it is more than just that; it must reflect a sense of ethics and values upon actions.

All writers, especially Ramadan, Rahner and Smith, are saying that faith must be rooted in a “living spirituality” that engages a contextual understanding of faith and life. It cannot be solely mystical or solely worldly. Faith must consider the real world and history of life. This is crucial for dialogue, as all authors recognize.

This supports questions raised by Nasr’s article that theology gets in the way; instead, theology must be foundational in discussing the concrete experiences and realities of those practicing and living the faith traditions of Islam and Christianity, and not just thrown out the window as if theology is totally outside concepts of economic justice, women’s rights, democracy, and pluralism.

Dialogue should engage theological differences, but these discussions must start with the communities’ needs, so that dialogue, like theology, remains “concrete:” reflecting and respecting the everyday issues of these people of faith, where parallels, shared principles, and joint actions can occur.

All the writers show that theological issues do not have to be divisive; even soteriological concepts are more open than most practitioners of these faiths realize. The question has evolved from “Does theology exist in Islam?” to “How can we mediate our common values to express our theology?” as well as “How can we come to a common understanding of the role of theology in dialogue?”

Christians and Muslims have shared values; they just have different ways of expressing them theologically, such as how each views Sacred Law. To discuss theologically different religions with the goal of understanding is an arduous task; however, it is not impossible. We must take Smith’s advice, and move beyond the particular “beliefs” of a faith to engage another on how these values are acted out in a “living spirituality” rooted in concrete experience, reality, and history that envisions a better world.

Works Cited

Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. “Islamic-Christian Dialogue: Problems and Obstacles to be Pondered and Overcome.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 11(2), July 2000, pp. 213-227.

Rahner, Karl. “Oneness and Threefoldness of God in Discussion with Islam.” Theological Investigations XVIII, 1983, pp. 105-121.

Ramadan, Tariq. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. On Understanding Islam. New York: Mouton Publishers, 1981.


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